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Abstract
Federated learning is a distributed machine learn-
ing method that aims to preserve the privacy of
sample features and labels. In a federated learn-
ing system, ID-based sample alignment approaches
are usually applied with few efforts made on the
protection of ID privacy. In real-life applications,
however, the confidentiality of sample IDs, which
are the strongest row identifiers, is also drawing
much attention from many participants. To relax
their privacy concerns about ID privacy, this paper
formally proposes the notion of asymmetrical ver-
tical federated learning and illustrates the way to
protect sample IDs. The standard private set inter-
section protocol is adapted to achieve the asymmet-
rical ID alignment phase in an asymmetrical verti-
cal federated learning system. Correspondingly, a
Pohlig-Hellman realization of the adapted protocol
is provided. This paper also presents a genuine with
dummy approach to achieving asymmetrical feder-
ated model training. To illustrate its application, a
federated logistic regression algorithm is provided
as an example. Experiments are also made for val-
idating the feasibility of this approach.
1 Introduction
Machine learning algorithms play an essential role in extract-
ing patterns and useful knowledge from datasets. Traditional
machine learning methods are usually developed from the
centralized or parallel perspective, i.e., the overall datasets
are stored in one, or a group of computing machines in hand,
and the learning objective can be efficiently achieved by the
machines with their direct access to the datasets. Although
many of those algorithms are well-studied and have excellent
performance over even petabyte-scale datasets, they are still
confronted with serious troubles when implemented in the
business or research fields with high concerns on data con-
fidentiality. For example, every day portable and wearable
smart devices collect billions of users’ motion and body con-
dition information, which contains numerous valuable pat-
terns that benefit reproductions. However, it is impossible to
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perform traditional machine learning algorithms for knowl-
edge extraction, because the distributedly collected data are
prohibited to upload to central servers subject to strict pri-
vacy laws and regulations, such as the GDPR. Similar exam-
ples also exist in a variety of areas, such as finance, health,
education, etc.
Federated learning, first proposed in 2016 [McMahan et
al., 2016], is a privacy-preserving machine learning approach
to analyzing the patterns of distributed sensitive datasets. The
notion was later expanded to a clearer and more compre-
hensive framework with three components: horizontal fed-
erated learning in which participants share the same feature
space, vertical federated learning in which participants share
the same ID space, and federated transfer learning for disjoint
data distributions. In this framework, every distributed partic-
ipant shares encrypted messages that are computed based on
their individual datasets and updates its local model according
to the received messages, with or without the presence of a
trusted third party. However, in federated learning, especially
in the vertical scenario, it is common but unreasonable to omit
the investigation of the sample ID’s information leakage after
leveraging them to align distributed datasets. In a standard
vertical federated learning system, for example, samples held
by different participants are aligned by executing some secure
protocol and letting everyone know what the exact intersect
set is. In practical applications, the participants are usually
companies or institutions in competitive relations, and many
clients of one company are potential advertising targets of an-
other. On the one hand, thus, the participants would not allow
the disclosure of their sample IDs. On the other hand, there
are asymmetrical federations in real life, in which a subset of
the participants are small companies with strong requirements
of ID privacy protection, while the other are large companies
who do not concern much ID privacy, because their guests are
almost all citizens in the society. Such an unbalanced setup
requires a vertical federated learning system to distinguish the
“weak” and the “strong” sides of the federation and take into
consideration their specific privacy protection demands.
In this paper, we specify the vertical federated learning into
two classes: the symmetrical and the asymmetrical, to de-
velop federated learning algorithms that preserve the privacy
of sample IDs for the participants who indeed demand. The
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
(i) We formally propose and comprehensively characterize
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the notion of asymmetrical vertical federated learning.
(ii) We incorporate the standard private set intersection pro-
tocol to achieve the asymmetrical ID alignment phase
in an asymmetrical vertical federated learning system.
In addition, we provide a Pohlig-Hellman realization of
the adapted private set intersection protocol.
(iii) We present a genuine with dummy approach to achiev-
ing asymmetrical federated model training. To illustrate
its application, we provide a federated logistic regres-
sion algorithm as an example. Experiments are also
made for validating the feasibility of the approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we formulate the symmetrical and asymmetrical classifi-
cation of vertical federated learning. We further present an
asymmetrical private set intersection protocol for ID align-
ment and one of its realizations in Section 3. Section 4
provides the genuine with dummy approach to asymmetrical
model training and its application to federated logistic regres-
sion, along with a few experimental validations in Section 5.
Finally, several concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
2 Problem Definition
In this section, we revisit the notion of vertical federated
learning and formally categorize it into two classes to study
the privacy preservation of sample IDs.
2.1 Vertical Federated Learning
Let D = (I,X ,Y) denote a complete dataset with I,X ,Y
representing the sample ID space, the feature space and the
label space, respectively. It was defined in [Yang et al.,
2019a] that the vertical federated learning is conducted over
two datasets D1 = (I1,X1,Y1), D2 = (I2,X2,Y2) satisfy-
ing
X1 = X2,Y1 = Y2, I1 6= I2.
In real-world applications, however, it is nearly impossible
to find two original datasets collected by distributed parties
that share exactly the same sample ID space. Therefore, as
a preparation phase for vertical federated learning, it is nec-
essary to introduce appropriate ID-alignment protocols that
assist each party with its secure identification of I1 = I2
and establishment of two datasets’ row mapping. We de-
fine Do1 = (Io1 ,X1,Y1),Do2 = (Io2 ,X2,Y2) as the pre-ID-
alignment datasets that correspond to D1 and D2, respec-
tively. Clearly, I1 ⊂ Io1 and I2 ⊂ Io2 . In addition, we writeIw as the whole ID space that contains all possible elements
in Do1 and Do2. Then the vertical federated learning presented
by [Yang et al., 2019a] is depicted in Figure 1.
2.2 Private Set Intersection
Recall that ID-alignment protocols are essential in the prepa-
ration of vertical federal model training. To achieve ID align-
ment, Private Set Intersection (PSI) protocols, as one of the
most well studied areas in secure multiparty computation, are
usually implemented in a federated learning system. In stan-
dard PSI, each party Pi holds a set Si, which involves Pi’s
confidential data. All parties would like to cooperatively find
the intersection S′ =
⋂
i Si, and in the meantime, each Pi
Figure 1: Symmetrical Vertical Federated Learning
keeps the elements in Si \ S′ private. The realization of PSI
protocols can be based on classical public-key cryptosystems
[Freedman et al., 2004; Liang and Chawathe, 2004], oblivi-
ous transfer [Pinkas et al., 2014], garbled circuits [Huang et
al., 2012], etc.
2.3 Symmetrical and Asymmetrical
Let us call the parties P1,P2 who own Do1,Do2. As can be
seen from Figure 1, P1 and P2 have equally powerful posi-
tions in the sense that the numbers of elements in their pre-
ID-alignment sample ID spaces Io1 , Io2 share the same order
of magnitude and both sets play a major role in the whole ID
space Iw. In fact, even if P1 picks e ∈ Iw uniformly at ran-
dom, there is |Io2 | / |Iw|  0 probability of e ∈ Io2 . In such
“federation of the strong”, each party would not gain much
knowledge by executing PSI protocols to obtain the intersec-
tion I1 = I2, and thus it bothers neither party to let the other
party know what IDs it possesses. Since finally both parties
symmetrically obtain the intersection for model training, we
term this scenario symmetrical vertical federated learning.
The opposite scenario is that P2, without loss of generality,
has |Io2 | / |Iw| ≈ 0, while P1 still holds |Io1 | / |Iw|  0. It is
common that the federated learning system to be established
is for P2’s learning task, and thus the labels are provided by
P2. This vertical data distribution is as shown in Figure 2.
Clearly, there is a sufficiently small probability that an ar-
bitrary ID e ∈ Iw one picks uniformly at random exactly
belongs to Io2 . Therefore, we say P2 is at the weak side in
the sense that each sample ID in Io2 is regarded as sensitive
information, whose privacy would be severely compromised
through the revelation of I1 = I2 by executing standard PSI
protocols. In such “federation of the weak and the strong”, it
is necessary to asymmetrically protect the ID privacy of the
weak party in the ID alignment phase. This scenario is termed
asymmetrical vertical federated learning.
It is reasonable not to analyze the “federation of the weak”
scenario, because we may shrink the whole space Iw to
Iw \ (Io1 ∪ Io2 ) so that this scenario can be reduced to the
“federation of the strong” one. Throughout this paper, we
impose the following assumption.
Assumption 1 Iw = Io1 ∪ Io2 .
It is evident that if Assumption 1 holds, either |Io1 | ≥
1
2 |Iw| or |Io2 | ≥ 12 |Iw|. Now by representing a positive
number n by n = a · 10b with a ∈ [10− 12 , 10 12 ) and naming b
the order of magnitude of n, we provide the following precise
definition for.
Definition 1 Under Assumption 1, vertical federated ma-
chine learning can be classified into two categories based
on the participating parties’ pre-ID-alignment sample ID
spaces.
(i) It is called Symmetrically Vertical Federated Learning
(SVFL) if
−1
2
≤ log10
|Io1 |
|Iw| , log10
|Io1 |
|Iw| ≤ 0.
(ii) It is called Asymmetrical Vertical Federated Learning
(AVFL) if either one of the following two inequalities
holds.
log10
|Io1 |
|Iw| < −
1
2
, (1)
log10
|Io2 |
|Iw| < −
1
2
. (2)
In AVFL, we further name P1 (or P2) the weak partic-
ipant if (1) (or (2)) holds, and P2 (or P1) the strong
participant.
Since Assumption 1 holds in Definition 1, there always exist
a weak and a strong participant in AVFL. Note that we base
the analysis above and the rest of the paper on the two-party
federation case for the simplicity of demonstration. In fact,
the analysis can be trivially extended to the multi-party case
by asymmetrically protecting the sample ID privacy of the
weak party.
3 Asymmetrical ID Alignment
ID alignment is typically the first stage of a vertical learning
workflow. In this section, we adapt the standard PSI protocol
to achieve asymmetrical ID alignment and provide a realiza-
tion using a classical cryptosystem.
3.1 Asymmetrical PSI Protocols
Recall that in SVFL’s ID alignment phase, the execution of
standard PSI protocols not only lets each party gain knowl-
edge about the samples they both hold, but also provides a
tag that manages to efficiently link together distributed sam-
ple fragments and paves the way for the follow-up federated
model training phase. To realize a proper ID-alignment phase
in AVFL, one has to adapt standard PSI protocols so that they
satisfy
(i) The exact intersection set I1 = I2 is kept private
against the strong participant.
(ii) In the federated model training phase, the distributed
samples with ID in I1 = I2 are still alignable.
Figure 2: Asymmetrical Vertical Federated Learning
Let Iow, Ios denote the pre-ID-alignment sample ID sets held
by the weak and the strong participant, respectively. Alterna-
tively, they are defined by
{Iow} = argmin
I∈{Io1 ,Io2}
|I| , {Ios} = argmax
I∈{Io1 ,Io2}
|I| .
A possible ID-alignment approach that meets requirements
(i)-(ii) above is to use a variant of PSI protocols that we
present below.
Definition 2 Asymmetrical PSI (APSI) protocols, as a vari-
ant of PSI protocols, yield an obfuscated set Iobf ⊂ Iw at
each party satisfying
I1 = I2 ⊂ Iobf ⊂ Ios .
In addition, only the weak participant further knows I1 = I2.
The output of such PSI protocols is illustrated in Figure 3.
3.2 A Pohlig-Hellman Realization
We now provide a realization of APSI protocols based on the
Pohlig-Hellman encryption. Define Zn = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}
and Z∗n ⊂ Zn as the set of integers coprime to n. Let
Gn = (Z∗n, ·) denote a multiplicative group. Then the well-
known Pohlig-Hellman encryption scheme is described by
the following three components.
(i) (Key generation) Select a prime number p such that ev-
ery plaintext is an element of Gp, where p − 1 has
at least one large prime factors. For example, select
p = 2q + 1 with q being also a prime number. Then
select a ∈ Gp−1 and compute a−1 ∈ Gp−1. Finally,
one reveals Gp as public knowledge and keeps (a, a−1)
as the key to this symmetrical cryptosystem.
(ii) (Encryption) Encrypt the plaintext m ∈ Gp by
Ea(m) = m
a.
(iii) (Decryption) Decrypt the ciphertext c ∈ Gp by
Da(c) = c
a−1 .
Figure 3: Asymmetrical PSI Protocols for AVFL
It is straightforward to show the commutative property of the
Pohlig-Hellman encryption by checking Ea ◦ Eb = Eb ◦ Ea
for any a, b ∈ Gp−1. Now we present an APSI protocol based
on the Pohlig-Hellman encryption in Algorithm 1.
Security Analysis. In Algorithm 1, the exchanged information
by step 6 is U1,U2,U
†
2, whose security is evidently guaran-
teed by the Pohlig-Hellman encryption scheme. By step 8,
the strong participant P1 receives the encrypted obfuscated
set Uobf† but it cannot distinguish which elements belong to
the encrypted true intersection set. In fact, P1 cannot even
obtain any plaintext based on Uobf† because the elements in
Uobf† are still encrypted with P2’s key b. By step 11, since
the cooperatively decrypted message is only Iobf , P1’s pri-
vate information Io1 \ Iobf is protected against the weak par-
ticipant P2. Clearly, in step 12, only Iobf is revealed to P1
with Io1 ∩ Io2 kept private by P2.
It can be noted that the security number λ is interpreted as
a cardinality ratio h(λ) of the obfuscated intersection set Iobf
to the true intersection set I1 = I2. As can be directly com-
puted, there is 1/h(λ) probability that a uniformly random
element in Iobf that P1 picks belongs to I1 = I2. Clearly,
h(0) = 1, in which case Iobf = I1 = I2 and P1,P2 both ob-
tain the true intersect set. In this special case, AVFL becomes
SVFL. As λ goes up from zero to one, 1/h(λ) exponentially
decreases, and thereby it becomes more difficult for P1 to po-
tentially identify I1 = I2 from Iobf . When λ reaches the
maximum one, the obfuscated set Iobf = Io1 , i.e., the whole
ID space of P1 is used for obfuscating and P1 cannot gain any
knowledge by executing Algorithm 1.
4 Asymmetrical Federated Model Training
In this section, we investigate the asymmetrical federated
model training process and propose a novel and general ap-
proach to training a model in an asymmetrical fashion that
is as good as in a symmetrical fashion. We also provide an
application of this approach to an existing federated learning
algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Pohlig-Hellman APSI Protocol
Input: The strong participant P1 holds Io1 . The weak partici-
pant P2 holds Io2 . Security number λ ∈ [0, 1].
Output: P1 only obtains Iobf satisfying Io1 ∩ Io2 ⊂ Iobf and∣∣Iobf ∣∣
|Io1 ∩ Io2 |
= h(λ)
4
=
( |Io1 |
|Io1 ∩ Io2 |
)λ
.
P2 obtains both Io1 ∩ Io2 andIobf .
1: P1 and P2 negotiate a public group Gp for Pohlig-
Hellman encryption.
2: P1 and P2 privately generates keys (a, a−1), (b, b−1) ∈
Gp−1 ×Gp−1, respectively.
3: P1 and P2 computes U1 = {Ea(x) : x ∈ Io1} and U2 ={Eb(x) : x ∈ Io2}, respectively.
4: P1 and P2 exchange U1,U2.
5: P1 and P2 computes U†2 = {Ea(x) : x ∈ U2} and U†1 ={Eb(x) : x ∈ U1}, respectively.
6: P1 sends U†2 to P2.
7: P2 randomly selectsUobf† satisfyingU†1∩U†2 ⊂ Uobf† ⊂
U†1 and
∣∣Uobf ∣∣ = h(λ) ∣∣∣U†1 ∩U†2∣∣∣ .
8: P2 sends Uobf† to P1.
9: P1 computes Uobf = {Da(x) : x ∈ Uobf†}.
10: P1 sends Uobf to P2.
11: P2 computes Iobf = {Db(x) : x ∈ Uobf} and Io1 ∩Io2 =Io2 ∩ Iobf .
12: P2 shares Iobf to P1.
4.1 Genuine with Dummy Approach
Using APSI protocols given in Definition 2, the weak par-
ticipant obtains the true intersection set I1 = I2, which
is a subset of the obfuscated intersection set Iobf that the
strong participant knows. As shown in Figure 3, the verti-
cal federated learning domain now contains margins, i.e., all
labels and a few features are missing for the samples with
their ID in Iobf \ I1. Indeed, federated transfer learning
[Yang et al., 2019a] can be used to fill in the margins by
the feature-representation-transfer approach [Pan and Yang,
2009]. Nevertheless, in many practical applications, such
as financial risk management, it is normal to train machine
learning model based on the small but exactly original data in
I1 = I2, in order to avoid misjudgment of dishonest conduct.
In these areas, the learned features and labels for Iobf \ I1,
even if not “negatively transferred”, may lead to undesirably
strict or loose risk control strategies. Therefore, it is nec-
essary to design asymmetrical model training schemes that
take the distributed output of APSI protocols and yield the
same or almost the same result as the SVFL. Based on the
standard vertical model training in [Yang et al., 2019a], we
now present a Genuine with Dummy (GWD) approach to
achieving asymmetrical model training as follows. Note that
a trusted third party P3 is introduced as a secure coordinator.
(i) P3 generates a public-key cryptosystem, and sends the
public key to P1,P2.
(ii) P1,P2 exchange intermediate variables to cooperatively
compute gradient and loss. The weak participants, say
P2, normally execute computation rule for the samples
in I1, i.e., the genuine, but set the variables that corre-
spond to the samples in Iobf \ I1, i.e., the dummy, to
specific mathematical identities so that their existence
will not affect the relevant computed result. The identi-
ties can be, for example, zero in addition, one in multi-
plication or f(x) = x in function composition.
(iii) P1,P2 turn to P3 for gradient and loss decryption ser-
vice, and update their local models.
As we can see, the central idea of the GWD approach pro-
vided above is to let the weak participant execute the normal
protocol for the genuine samples, while mathematically mute
the dummy samples that it actually does not hold before send-
ing them to the strong participant. To keep the strong partic-
ipant unaware of the existence of the dummy samples, a po-
tential method is to implement semantically secure encryp-
tion scheme, such as Paillier cryptosystem [Paillier, 1999],
to disable the participant from efficiently distinguishing the
identities out of a group of normal variables. In addition, it is
clear that the asymmetrical model training achieved with the
GWD approach would exhibit exactly the same performance
as the standard (or symmetrical) model training because the
introduced identities strictly guarantee invariant intermediate
results at every step.
An illustration of GWD architecture is provided in Fig-
ure 4, which depicts the federated execution process of
a general subroutine. The weak participant would like
to send encrypted messages v1, v2 to the strong partici-
pant and then expect a response of the execution result
subroutine(v1, v2). However, the direct transmission would
give away the genuine IDs. Instead, the weak particpant
sends v1, v2 along with the mathematical identities e1, e2
corresponding to the dummy samples, and finally receives
subroutine(v1, v2, e1, e2), which is identical to what it ex-
pects. Besides, the strong participant performs the computa-
tion subroutine(·), while remaining oblivious to the genuine
IDs.
4.2 Asymmetrical Vertical Logistic Regression
We now take the coordinator-free federated logistic regres-
sion training presented in [Yang et al., 2019b] as an example
and adapt it to an asymmetrical training protocol using the
GWD approach. Let 〈M〉 denote the ciphertext of a plain
message M . Then the adapted Asymmetrical Vertical Logis-
tic Regression (AVLR) training protocol is presented in Al-
gorithm 2.
In Algorithm 2, the central subroutine is to let the weak
participant P2 share the encrypted scalars 〈φik〉, based on
which the strong participant P1 evaluates its local gradient
〈∇sL(wk)〉. To implement the GWD approach, P2 com-
putes φik for ei ∈ Io1 ∩ Io2 based on the true labels, but set
φik = 0 for all ei ∈ Iobf \ (Io1 ∩ Io2 ), which is the addi-
tion identity. Due to the fact that crypto preserves semantic
security, P2 can neither identify 〈0〉 from the received set of
φiks, nor distinguish which samples are the dummies. Since
P1 performs additions to compute∇sL(wk), the presence of
the dummy samples’ φik would have no effects on the result.
Algorithm 2 Asymmetrical Vertical Logistic Regression
Model Training
Input: The strong participant P1 holds the sample set
(ei,x
s
i ) ∈ Iobf × Rm
s
. The weak participant P2 holds the
sample set (ei,xwi , y
w
i ) ∈ Io1 ∩Io2 ×Rm
w ×{0, 1}. Learning
rate η > 0.
Output: P1,P2 learn the weights ws∗ ∈ Rm
s
,ww∗ ∈
Rmw , respectively, such that the joint weight
w∗ = (ws>∗ ,w
w>
∗ )
> is the global optimum of the
model.
1: P2 instantiates a semantically secure additively homo-
morphic cryptosystem crypto.
2: P1 and P2 initialize their model estimates ws0 ∈ Rm
s
and
ww0 ∈ Rm
w
, respectively.
3: while k = 0, 1, 2, . . . do
4: P1 sends Lobfk = {(ei,ws>k xsi ) : ei ∈ Iobf} to P2.
5: Based on Lobfk , P2 computes lik = ws>k xsi +ww>k xwi
for all ei ∈ Io1 ∩ Io2 , and further
φik =
{
yi −
(
1 + exp(−lik)
)−1
if ei ∈ Io1 ∩ Io2 ;
0 if ei ∈ Iobf \ (Io1 ∩ Io2 ).
6: P2 uses crypto to encrypt φik for all i ∈ Iobf and
sends Fobfk = {(ei, 〈φik〉) : ei ∈ Iobf} to P1.
7: P2 computes the global likelihood and its local gradi-
ent in plaintext space
L(wk) = 1|Io1 ∩ Io2 |
∑
ei∈Io1∩Io2
yilik
− log(1 + exp(lik)),
∇wL(wk) = 1|Io1 ∩ Io2 |
∑
ei∈Io1∩Io2
φikx
w
i .
8: Based on Fobfk , P1 computes its local gradient in ci-
pherspace
〈|Io1 ∩ Io2 | · ∇sL(wk)〉 =
∑
ei∈Iobf
〈φik〉xsi ,
9: P1 further masks its local gradient by Gs = rk 
〈|Io1 ∩ Io2 | · ∇sL(wk)〉, where r ∈ Rm
s
is randomly
chosen and  denotes the Hadamard product. P1 fur-
ther sends Gs to P2 for decryption.
10: P2 uses crypto to decrypt Gs and divides the result
by |Io1 ∩ Io2 |. Finally, P2 manages to send back rk ∇sL(wk) to P1.
11: P1 uses the Hadamard division to recover∇sL(wk).
12: P1 and P2 update their local models by
wsk+1 = w
s
k + η∇sL(wk),
wwk+1 = w
w
k + η∇wL(wk),
respectively.
13: end while
Figure 4: Architecture of the GWD approach
In this way, the dataset, over which the federation of P1 and
P2 train their model, is inherently the sample set with IDs
in Io1 ∩ Io2 . This guarantees that the asymmetrical vertical
training yields the same result as the standard (symmetrical)
vertical training does.
5 Experiments
This section provides a few experiments that validate the fea-
sibility of the APSI + AVLR protocol and compare it with the
existing standard (symmetrical) protocol.
5.1 Settings
We implement our APSI and AVLR algorithms in the fed-
erated learning framework FATE1. The performance of the
APSI + AVLR protocol is demonstrated over the dataset
MNIST2, which has 60000 samples and 784 features. To
adapt the dataset to our distributed setup, we manually al-
locate an ID to each sample, split and assign the partitions to
the weak participant P2 and the strong participant P1 as in
Table 1.
392 Features 392 Features
10000 Samples P2 P150000 Samples (Abandoned)
Table 1: MNIST Dataset Partitioning
As indicated by Table 1, the underlying federated train-
ing would be performed over the 10000 samples that both
P1 and P2 hold. Therefore, the training performance is ex-
pected not to be as good as other algorithms that take the
whole dataset as input. However, it is fairly reasonable to uti-
lize the distributed setup in Table 1, since the experiments are
conducted for the purpose of validating the feasibility of the
1https://github.com/FederatedAI/FATE
2http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
APSI + AVLR protocol and comparing it with the standard
(symmetrical) version.
For the computing hardware, we use two individual ma-
chines to serve as the participants and either of them has 4
CPU cores and 16GB RAM. These machines are both located
in the same region of Tencent Cloud3.
5.2 Numerical Results
In the experiments of the APSI + AVLR protocol, we adopt
the fixed learning rate η = 0.15 but various security num-
bers λ = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1, and let the training process ex-
ecute for 150 iterations. It is worth mentioning the standard
(symmetrical) model training corresponds the λ = 0 case in
our experiments. We plot the trajectories of training loss and
AUC in Figure 5 and Figure 6, respectively. In Figure 5, the
trajectories are almost the same for different λs, especially
for the λ = 0 and the λ 6= 0 case, which also holds true for
the AUC trend in Figure 6. The observation of these figures
validates that the APSI + AVLR protocol has as good perfor-
mance as its symmetrical version due to the introduction of
mathematical identities.
Figure 5: Training Loss Trajectories of the APSI + AVLR Protocol
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the privacy preservation of sample
IDs in vertical federated learning. To meet the privacy pro-
tection demands of different participants, we first proposed
the notion of asymmetrical vertical federated learning. We
then adapted the standard private set intersection protocol to
achieve the asymmetrical ID alignment phase in an asymmet-
rical vertical federated learning system. Correspondingly, a
Pohlig-Hellman realization of the adapted protocol was pro-
vided. To achieve asymmetrical federated model training, we
also presented a genuine with dummy approach. We illus-
trated its application by providing a federated logistic regres-
3https://cloud.tencent.com/
Figure 6: Training AUC Trajectories of the APSI + AVLR Protocol
sion as an example. Experiments were also made for validat-
ing the feasibility of this approach.
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